In this work, we present IBFT 2.0 (Istanbul BFT 2.0), which is a Proof-of-Authority (PoA) Byzantinefault-tolerant (BFT) blockchain consensus protocols that (i) ensures immediate finality, (ii) is robust in an eventually synchronous network model and (iii) features a dynamic validator set. IBFT 2.0, as the name suggests, builds upon the IBFT blockchain consensus protocol retaining all of the original features while addressing the safety and liveness limitations described in one of our previous works. In this paper, we present a high-level description of the IBFT 2.0 protocol and related robustness proof. Formal specification of the protocol and related formal proofs will be subject of a separate body of work. We also envision a separate work that will provide detailed implementation specifications for IBFT 2.0.
1 Introduction IBFT 2.0 is Proof-of-Authority (PoA) Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant (BFT) blockchain consensus protocol that enables consortium network to leverage on the capabilities of Ethereum smart contracts, ensures immediate finality, is robust in an eventually synchronous network and features a dynamic validator set. As the name suggests, the IBFT 2.0 protocol is based on the IBFT protocol that was was developed around early 2017 by AMIS Technologies [11] and was fully implemented in Quorum [14] by around November 2017. The IBFT protocol features all of the properties of the IBFT 2.0 protocol mentioned above except for robustness in eventually synchronous networks as identified by Saltini [15] . IBFT 2.0 addresses the robustness issues of the IBFT protocol while maintaining all of its original properties. In the following section we describe each of these properties in more detail.
Properties of the IBFT 2.0 protocol
Blockchain consensus protocol. Blockchains are the most widely adopted implementations of distributed ledgers which are append-only databases of transactions that are replicated across multiple participants, hereafter called nodes. The trust and responsibility for maintaining the database is spread across all of the nodes or a subset of them. This is in contrast to a traditional centralised system where full trust is given to a central authority responsible for maintaining the database. One of the issues with this traditional approach is that the central authority has the power to alter the database unilaterally. The decentralisation aspect of distributed ledger technology makes it well suited to any use case where the need for a central authority is either adding costs to the system or undermining the trust in the system itself. Blockchains implements distributed ledgers by batching transactions into blocks and cryptographically linking each block to the previous one forming a chain of blocks, which is where the technology takes its name from. Consensus protocols play a fundamental role in the blockchain technology as they have the responsibility to ensure that the chain of blocks replicated amongst the nodes is consistent. The type of network and environment assumptions made when designing a consensus protocol influence how the blockchain performs once deployed in a real environment and network. Some of the key performance metrics that are heavily influenced by consensus protocols are: (i) throughput or number of transactions per second, (ii) latency or time taken from when a transaction is submitted to the system to when the transaction is included in a block and (iii) robustness or what type of attacks the protocol can withstand.
Ethereum smart contracts. Compared to Bitcoin, which was the first widely adopted blockchain and mainly allows transferring values between nodes, the Ethereum blockchain specifies a Turing-complete language that can be used to build small distributed programs, called smart contracts, that are executed in a sandboxed runtime by each node. The runtime, called the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) modifies the Ethereum global state maintained by each node. This means that any user of the Ethereum blockchain has the capability to create smart contracts that can govern the interaction between the different users of the system and automate value transfer in a decentralised fashion. One of the first use cases for Ethereum was the creation of escrow smart contracts eliminating the need for a trusted 3rd party.
Byzantine-fault-tolerant (BFT). Byzantine-fault-tolerant, or BFT, specifies the type of node fault mode that the consensus protocol can cope with. Specifically, BFT identifies a class of blockchain consensus protocols that ensure blockchain consistency despite some of the nodes, referred to as Byzantine, being malicious and acting arbitrarily. The usage of the word Byzantine to identify malicious nodes dates back to the paper "The Byzantine Generals Problem" by Lamport et al. [10] . The Byzantine failure mode is the strongest failure mode considered in the consensus protocol literature. Another common but weaker failure mode is fail-stop failure mode which only considers nodes stopping communicating but never acting maliciously.
Proof-of-Authority (PoA). Another way to classify consensus protocols is by the technique used to prevent an attacker from conducting a Sybil attack which consists in one node being able to gain power in the system by creating multiples pseudonymous identities. Typically, creating a new digital identity that can be used to interact with a blockchain is quite cheap as it just requires generating a random private key and the related public key which can be done in a matter of few seconds on any modern personal computer. One the most widely used and famous techniques for preventing Sybil attacks is proof of work which was originally pioneered by Dwork et al. [6] and gained subsequent publicity by its employment in Bitcoin. Proof-of-work (PoW) requires node to spend compute effort in solving a hard cryptographic puzzle before being able to propose a block to be added to the blockchain. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is another quite well known technique where the right to propose new blocks is given according to the amount of stake owned. In contrast, in Proof-of-Authority, or PoA, Sybil attacks are prevented by conferring the right to create new blocks only to a defined set of nodes. Within the IBFT 2.0 protocol, the nodes with the right to create new blocks and ensuring blockchain consistency are called validators.
Consortium Blockchain. Compared to permissionless, or public, blockchains, like Bitcoin or Ethereum, where anybody can join the network and participate in the protocol, in consortium networks there exists some level of permissioning which enables only a set of nodes in proposing new blocks and participating in the consensus protocol. It should be quite evident why PoA type consensus protocols, like the IBFT protocol family, are well suited to this type of permissioning. It should be noted that while not every node can propose new blocks, some consortium blockchains allow any node to read data from the blockchain. The IBFT protocol family also affords for this type of configuration.
Immediate Finality. A transaction is defined as final once it is included in the blockchain and it can not be removed from it or changed of position except if the environment is compromised, which, for example, can occur if the number of Byzantine nodes is higher than the maximum number that the protocol can withstand. Immediate finality means that as soon as a transaction is included in a block, the protocol guarantees that it will not be removed or changed of position. As comparison, the PoW consensus protocol in Bitcoin and Ethereum only guarantees eventual probabilistic finality where the deeper a transaction is in the blockchain, the less probable is that the transaction can be removed or changed of position. As further comparison, Casper FFG [2] , the Ethereum 2.0 PoS consensus protocol, provides eventual "non-probabilistic" finality, where transaction will eventually reach a state where they cannot be removed or moved of position but this does not necessarily happen at every block. In IBFT 2.0 finality is immediate.
Robustness. Our definition of robustness for the IBFT protocol family is based on the definition of robustness for public transaction ledgers provided in Garay et al. [9] . For the purpose of this definition, the position of a transaction within the transaction ledger implemented by the IBFT 2.0 protocol is defined as a pair with the first component corresponding to the height of the block including the transaction and the second component corresponding to the position of the transaction within the block. Definition 1. A blockchain consensus protocol implements a robust distributed permissioned transaction ledger with immediate finality and t-Byzantine-fault-tolerance if, provided that no more than t validators are Byzantine, it guarantees the following two properties:
• Persistence. If an honest node adds transaction T in position i of its local transaction ledger, then (i) T is the only transaction that can ever be added in position i by any other honest node, (ii) T will eventually be added to the local transaction ledger of any other honest node. • Liveness. Provided that a transaction is submitted to all honest validators, then the transaction will eventually be included in the local transaction ledger of at least one honest node.
Eventually synchronous network. In the consensus protocol literature there are three main network models that have been considered which differ on the assumption made regarding transmission latency:
• Synchronous network: the maximum latency (time required for a message to reach the recipient) is bounded and known; • Asynchronous network: the maximum latency is unknown and messages may never be delivered;
• Partially synchronous network: this model, which was first introduced by Dwork et al. [5] , lies in between the other two. Specifically, there are two possible definitions of partial synchrony: -Messages are guaranteed to be delivered but the maximum latency, while finite, is unknown. To the best of our knowledge, no specific name has been defined for this model; -Eventually synchronous network: there exists a point in time, called global stabilisation time, or GST, after which the message delay is bounded by a finite and constant value;
The model with the weakest assumptions is the asynchronous network model, followed by the partially synchronous network model and the synchronous network model in this order. Between the two definitions of partial synchrony, eventual synchrony is the one with the weakest assumptions. As proved by Fischer et al. [8] in 1985, no consensus protocol that aims to tolerate at least one fail-stop node is guaranteed to terminate in the asynchronous model (the one with the weakest assumption). There exist solutions that operate in the asynchronous network model, but the termination is only guaranteed probabilistically [1, 12] . The IBFT 2.0 protocol guarantees deterministic termination of the sub-protocol that has the responsibility to decide on the blocks to be added to the blockchain which means that IBFT 2.0 guarantees that the blockchain does not stop growing. However, as discussed in the robustness proof section, a probabilistic assumption is required to show that for any block there is eventually a block created successively to it which is not empty. This second condition is important for the Liveness property stated above. In Section 5.1.1, we discuss how the IBFT 2.0 protocol can be modified to drop any probabilistic assumption and achieve deterministic robustness under the eventually synchronous network model which is the weakest assumption where termination can be deterministically guaranteed.
Dynamic validator set. Compared to classic (non-blockchain) consensus protocols like PBFT [3] , where the set of protocol nodes is known in advance and never changes, IBFT 2.0, like Clique, allows the nodes to add and remove validators by a voting mechanism.
Our Contribution
As mentioned above, IBFT 2.0 builds upon the IBFT consensus protocol [11, 14] addressing the following limitations of IBFT as described by Saltini [15] .
• Persistence is not guaranteed.
-One Byzantine validator can potentially be able to remove or change the position of a transaction that has already been finalised. -In a network of six validators, even if all validators are honest, a network partitioning can cause the blockchains maintained by two sets of three validators each to diverge. Once the partitioning is resolved, validators have to choose one chain which means removing or reordering the transactions of the other chain. -IBFT does not guarantee that a transaction added to the local blockchain of one validator is eventually added to the local blockchain of all other nodes. • Liveness is not guaranteed. Specifically, the IBFT protocol may reach a state where no new blocks can be added to any local blockchain which means that no new transactions can be added to the distributed ledger.
While "Correctness Analysis of IBFT" [15] proposes a clear solution for addressing the issues with the Persistence property of the IBFT protocol, it only sketches two possible solutions to the Liveness issue without providing a full description of the resulting protocol. As a contribution, this work defines a complete solution to the Persistence and Liveness issues identified in [15] and provides related robustness proof.
In this work we present a protocol-level model of the IBFT 2.0 consensus protocol well suited for reasoning about the robustness of the protocol by abstracting the details of the actual implementation [13] . We envision releasing a future body of work describing the details of the implementation (e.g. precise encoding of the messages, precise definition of the header structure) which can be used to create interoperable implementation of the protocol in any Ethereum client. We also envision to produce a more formal definition of the protocol using formal languages (e.g. TLA+, Verdi, Alloy) and use formal proof systems to prove the properties of the protocol.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our analysis model. In Section 3 we describe the IBFT 2.0 protocol as implemented in Pantheon [13] . In Section 4 we present the robustness analysis of the IBFT 2.0 protocol and in Section 5 we present a series of improvements that can applied to the IBFT 2.0 protocol.
System Model
The system model considered for IBFT 2.0 is the same system model considered in the analysis of IBFT [15] . We re-state the properties of the model here for convenience.
Asynchronous nodes. We consider a system composed of an unbounded number of asynchronous nodes, each of them maintaining a local copy of the blockchain obtained by adding blocks to it as specified by the IBFT 2.0 protocol. We assume that all nodes have the same genesis block.
Network Model. The IBFT 2.0 protocol relies on the Ethereum ÐΞVp2p protocol for the delivering of all protocol messages. We model the gossip network as an eventually synchronous network, as defined in Dwork et al. [5] , where there exists a point in time called global stabilisation time (GST), after which the message delay is bounded by a constant, ∆. Before GST there is not bound on the message delay and we admit messages being lost.
Failure Model. We consider a Byzantine failure mode system, where Byzantine nodes can behave arbitrarily. In contrast, honest nodes never diverge from the protocol definition. We denote the maximum number of Byzantine nodes that an eventually synchronous network of n nodes participating in the consensus protocol can be tolerant to with f (n). As proved in Dwork et al. [5] , the relationship between the total number of nodes, n, and the maximum number of Byzantine nodes can be expressed as follows:
Cryptographic Primitives. The IBFT 2.0 protocol uses the Keccak hash function variant as per Ethereum Yellow Paper [16] to produce digests of blocks. We assume that the Keccak hash function is collision-resistant. The IBFT 2.0 protocol relies on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature scheme already used in the Ethereum protocol to sign transactions. We assume that this signature scheme ensures uniqueness and unforgeability. Uniqueness means that the signatures generated for two distinct messages are different with high probability.
The unforgeability property ensures that Byzantine nodes, even if they collude, cannot forge digital signatures produced by honest nodes. We use m σv to denote a message m signed by validator v.
Protocol Description
In this section we provide a description of the IBFT 2.0 protocol. We write "IBFT 2.0 (IBFT)" to indicate sections of the descriptions that apply to both IBFT and IBFT 2.0.
As common to any blockchain implementation, each IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) node maintains a local copy of the blockchain where the first block, called genesis block, is the same for all nodes. Each block B added to the blockchain must be cryptographically linked to another block in the blockchain, B p which is commonly defined as the parent of block B, and, conversely, B is defined as the child of B p . In IBFT 2.0 (IBFT), starting from the genesis block, the next block to be added to the local blockchain maintained by a node is the child of the latest block that was added to the blockchain. As it may be evident by now, the IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) blockchain can be modelled as a linked list of blocks, rather than a tree like the public Ethereum blockchain.
In alignment with the terminology used in literature, the height of a block is defined as the number of parent links separating the block from the genesis block which has height 0.
The IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) protocol can be modelled as running sequential instances of what we call the IBFT-2.0block-finalisation-protocol, where the objective of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is to decide which Ethereum block, and consequently which set of transactions, are to be added at height h of the blockchain maintained by any IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) node. Only a subset of the entire set of IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) nodes can participate in the h-th instance of the block finalisation protocol. We call this set of nodes the validators for height/instance h and refer to each member of this set as a validator for height/instance h.
We also refer to all of the nodes not included in the validator set for height/instance h as standard nodes. We often omit for height/instance h when this is clear from the context. The set of validators for each instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is deterministically computed as function of the chain of blocks from the genesis block until the block with height h − 1.
As explained in more detail in the following section, each instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is organised in rounds and in each round one of the validators is given the responsibility to propose an Ethereum block for the height associated with the specific instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol that the validator is running. Once agreement is reached, the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol creates a finalised block which includes the Ethereum block and additional information that allows any node, even nodes that did not participate in the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, to verify that agreement on the Ethereum block included in the finalised block was correctly reached.
In practice, each IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) node adds finalised blocks to its local blockchain, not only the Ethereum blocks included in them. In this way, any node joining the network at any point in time, when synching its local blockchain with its peers, receives all the information required to verify that agreement was indeed reached correctly on each block that it receives, even on those created before it joined the network. Each IBFT 2.0 finalised block FB can be modelled by the tuple (FB EB , FB F P ) where FB EB is the Ethereum block to be added to the blockchain, FB F P is the proof that agreement was correctly reached on the position in the chain of the block FB EB . Each finalisation proof F P can be in turn modelled by the tuple (F B r , F B CS ) where F B r is the round number of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol during the execution of which agreement on the block inclusion in the blockchain was reached and FB CS is a list of signatures on both the Ethereum block and the round proving that agreement was indeed reached by a correct execution of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol. More detail on how this list of signatures, called commit seals, are computed is presented in Section 3.1.
Each Ethereum block can carry a vote, cast by the proposer of that block, to add a validator to or remove a validator from the validator set. Once more than half of the validators cast a consistent vote to add or remove a validator to/from the validator set, the validator is added or removed from the validator set starting from the next block and all of the votes targeting this validator are discarded. In this paper we do not provide a pseudocode description of this algorithm, but we may add it to a future revision of this work.
The IBFT 2.0 consensus protocol is described by the pseudocode in Algorithms 1 and 2 where:
• Statements are expressed in a mathematical form but with standard mathematical symbols replaced by their equivalent English version, e.g we write in rather than ∈, and rather than ∧, there exists rather than ∃ and so on. Our intent is to provide an unambiguous definition of the protocol which can be understood by people that are not familiar with standard mathematical notation. Also, comments identified by text in typewriter font and green colour are used to provide natural language description of pseudocode statements which may not be immediately obvious; • For brevity of notation, we avoid using individual existential quantifiers (i.e ∃ in mathematical notation and there exists in "English notation") for message fields but rather express existential quantifier on the entire message. We use an overhead line (e.g var), to indicate message fields that, if the extensive notation was used, then they should be expressed via an existential quantifier. For example there exists f 1 , f 2 in receivedM essages v stands for there exists f 2 such that there exists f 1 , f 2 ∈ receivedM essages v ; • Each of the upon blocks in the pseudocode is assumed to be executed atomically when the condition specified after the upon keyword is satisfied; • Dark red colour denotes messages used only for modelling purposes and that do not have an immediate one-to-one relationship with the messages of the ETH sub-protocol; • Black colour when applied to messages denotes IBFT 2.0 specific messages not included in the current ETH sub-protocol; • We use the notation T : (t 1 , . . . , t n ) to indicate a tuple (t 1 , . . . , t n ) that we successively refer to as T ; • π m (T ) corresponds to the m-th element of the tuple T where the first element has index 1. For example, π 2 ((t 1 , t 2 , t 3 )) corresponds to t 2 . 
For the purpose of this work, we consider that isValidBlock(EB , EB p ) only verifies the following fields of the standard Ethereum header: paren-tHash, stateRoot, transactionsRoot, receiptsRoot, logsBloom, number, gasLimit, gasUsed. These fields are verified as specified in [16] . The IBFT 2.0 (IBFT) protocol implementation actually verifies also the other fields but in a different way than specified in [16] . We do not describe how these fields are verified as this is out of the scope of this work and does not affect our results. These details will be discussed in a future document describing the implementation details of the IBFT 2.0 protocol.
As described by Algorithm 1, the different instances of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol are started and stopped in the same way that instances are started and stopped in the IBFT protocol. Finalised blocks are delivered to nodes using the standard ETH ÐΞVp2p sub-protocol. In the pseudocode we abstract the actual ETH sub-protocol and model the reception of a finalised block FB with the reception of a FINALISED-BLOCK, FB message. No such message really exists in the implementation of the IBFT 2.0 protocol [13] . As per standard ETH sub-protocol, a block can be received either via an unsolicited NewBlock message or via the pair of messages GetBlockHeaders/BlockHeaders followed by the pair of messages GetBlockBodies/BlockBodies [7] .
As described by the upon block at line 10, when a new finalised block is received by a node v, v executes the following operations: 
and any cs ∈ F P cs such that: if isV alidF inalisedBlock(FB ), v) then 13: chain send GET-BLOCKS, h v , h m v starts that instance.
As described by the function isV alidF inalisationBlock(FB, v) at line 3, an IBFT 2.0 finalised block FB is defined valid if and only if all of the following conditions are met:
• it contains at least Quorum(n) ≡ 2n 3 different commit seals, where n is the number of validators for instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, i.e. n ≡ n(chain v [0 : h − 1]); • each commit seal corresponds to the signature of one of the validators over the Ethereum block and the round number included in the finalisation proof.
Compared to IBFT, IBFT 2.0 adds the upon block at line 19 to address the Persistence issue identified in Lemma 6 of [15] . All of the IBFT 2.0 specific messages (i.e Proposal, Prepare, Commit and Round-Change) include the height of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol instance that they relate to. When a node v receives one of these messages including a height h m with value ≥ than the next expected height h v , if the sender of the message is one of the ÐΞVp2p peers of v, then v starts asking the peer for finalised blocks with height between the v's current height h v and the height h m included in the IBFT 2.0 message received. We model this with the transmission of a GET-BLOCKS, h v , h m message and model the peer's response to this request as a FINALISE-BLOCK, FB message. As above, this is not an exact description of the real messages sent by the implementation. It is a modelling of the ÐΞVp2p behaviour useful in this context for analysing the protocol. expectedHeight v [v ′ ] represents the blockchain height that node v expects node v ′ to have. In our modelling of the protocol, we use expectedHeight v [v ′ ] to express that Get-Blocks messages are sent only the first time that an IBFT 2.0 message with an height higher than h v is received.
Description of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
In this section we describe a generic h instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for a validator v as detailed in Algorithm 2.
While significant portions of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol are similar to the IBFT-block-finalisationprotocol presented in Section 3 of [15] , for the sake of completeness, this section describes the full IBFT-2.0block-finalisation-protocol. However, for those portions of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol that are identical or very similar to the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol, the description is taken almost verbatim from [15] .
As with the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol, the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is organised in rounds, starting from round 0, where validators progress to the next round once they suspect that in the current round they will not be able to decide on the block to be included at height h of the blockchain. Both in Algorithm 2 and here, the current round for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v is denoted by r h,v .
For each round, one of the validators is selected to play the role of block proposer. This selection is operated by the evaluation of proposer(chain v [0 :
is a deterministic function of the chain of blocks from the genesis block until the block with height h − 1 and the current round number.
The pseudocode at lines 2 to 4 introduces the following macros:
• n h,v : number of validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v;
These macros are used both in the pseudocode and in this section to simplify the notation when describing the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v. We use the term non-proposing validators for round r and instance h to indicate all of the validators for round r and instance h with the exclusion of the proposer for round r and instance h.
For the purpose of this work, we do not define the proposer selection function, but we state that it ensures that all of the validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol are selected for any sequence of n h,v consecutive rounds. The IBFT 2.0 protocol retains the IBFT protocol capability to specify two alternative logics for selecting the proposer for round 0:
• Sticky Proposer. The proposer for round 0 corresponds to the proposer of the block included in the previous finalised block; • Round-Robin Proposer. The proposer for round 0 corresponds to the proposer of the proposer selection sequence that comes after the proposer of the block included in the previous finalised block.
Compared to IBFT, in IBFT 2.0 there is no block locking mechanism. The safety of the protocol is guaranteed by the round change protocol discussed below which is based on the view change protocol of PBFT [3] .
As specified by the initialisation block (line 9), if v is the selected block proposer for the first round, i.e round 0, then v multicasts a Proposal message PROPOSAL, h, 0, KEC(PB ) σv , PB , ⊥ to all validators (including itself) which comprises the message PROPOSAL, h, 0, KEC(PB ) σv signed by v, the proposed block PB and a Round-Change-Certificate which for round 0 is empty, i.e. ⊥. More detail on how the Round-Change-Certificate is assembled is provided further down in this section when discussing how validators move to a different round. The proposed block PB is modelled here as a tuple where the first element is a standard Ethereum block and the second element is the current round number at which the Ethereum block was created which at initialisation is 0. KEC(·) represents the Keccak hash function. The pseudocode uses createNewProposedBlock(h, v ) to represent the creation of a new block with height h by validator v. Honest validators employee a fair transaction selection algorithm to decide which transactions to include in the next block. The definition of such algorithm is outside the scope of this work.
As specified by lines 31 to 32, a validator v accepts a Proposal message PROPOSAL, h pp , r pp , H , PB : (EB , r EB ), * if and only if all of the following conditions are met: The upon block at line 36 is executed the first time that all of the following conditions are met by validator v:
• v has accepted a Proposal message for the proposed block PB , i.e. acceptedP B h,v = PB ;
• v has received, from non-proposing validators for the current round, at least Quorum(n h,v ) − 1 Prepare messages for the current instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, current round and with digest H corresponding to the Keccak hash of the accepted proposed block PB .
When all of the conditions listed above are met for the first time, then:
• 
The upon block at line 44 is executed the first time that all of the following conditions are met by validator v:
• v has received, from at least different Quorum(n h,v ) validators for the current instance of the IBFT-2.0block-finalisation-protocol, a Commit message for the current instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisationprotocol, current round, with digest H corresponding to the Keccak hash of the accepted proposed block PB and commit seal signed by the sender of the Commit message.
• v creates a block finalisation proof modelled as a tuple comprising the current round number and the commit seals included in all the Commit messages that satisfy the condition on Commit messages stated above;
• v creates a finalised block modelled as a tuple comprising the Ethereum block included in the proposed block and the finalisation proof; • v broadcasts the finalised block to all nodes;
The pseudocode uses the state variable f inalisedBlockSent h,v to trigger the transmission of a finalised block only the first time that the conditions listed above are met. f inalisedBlockSent h,v is set at line 50 and reset in the StartN ewRound procedure at line 12.
In alignment with PBFT, IBFT 2.0 relies on a round change sub-protocol to detect whether the selected proposer may be Byzantine and causing the protocol to never terminate. As specified at lines 21 to 22, whenever a validator v starts a new round, it starts a round timer with duration exponential to the round number (see line 8). • all messages are for the same round number r rc and r rc is higher than the current round; We say that any set meeting these conditions is a valid Round-Change-Certificate for round r ′ where round r ′ is the round included in all of the Round-Change messages included in the Round-Change-Certificate. When all of the conditions listed above are met, then:
• v moves to the round number included in one of the Round-Change-Certificates with the highest round number, let RCC be the chosen Round-Change-Certificate and let r h be the round number of RCC; • if v was not already in r h , then v starts the round timer for round r h ;
• if v is the selected proposer for round r h , then v sends a Proposal message for the new round including the selected Round-Change-Certificate (RCC) and a proposed block calculated as follows: -if all of the Prepared-Certificates included in the Round-Change message are empty, i.e = ⊥, then the proposed block must be a tuple including any valid Ethereum block for height h and the current round number, which must match the round number of the Proposal message; -otherwise, the Ethereum block included in the tuple constituting the proposed block must match the proposed block received as part of one of the Round-Change messages including a Prepared-Certificate for the highest round amongst the rounds of all the other Prepared-Certificates included in the Round-Change-Certificate.
As specified by the upon block at line 71, a Proposal message PROPOSAL, h, r pp , H σ sender , PB , RCC for a round higher than 0 is accepted only if all of the following conditions are met:
• v is currently running the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol instance h pp , i.e h pp = h ;
• the round number r pp of the Proposal message is either higher than the current round or equal to the current round provided that v has not accepted any Proposal message for the current round (i.e acceptedP B = ⊥;); • H corresponds to the Keccak hash of the proposed block PB . The effect of accepting a Proposal message for a round r pp > 0 is essentially the same effect of accepting the Proposal message for round 0 with the addition of moving to round r pp , namely:
• v moves to round r pp and start related round timer if v was not already in round r pp ;
• v multicasts a Prepare message PREPARE, h, r h,v , H σv to all validators (including itself);
• v sets acceptedP B h,v to the proposed block PB indicating that it accepted a Proposal message for PB .
From here on the protocol proceeds as described above.
Algorithm 2: h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v. RoundT imerT imeout(r) ≡ timeoutForRoundZero · 2 r 9: Initialisation: if v = proposer(0) then 15: let PB ≡ (createNewProposedBlock(h, v), 0) In this section we show that the IBFT 2.0 protocol is robust when operating in an eventually synchronous network.
As such the eventually synchronous network model assumption is assumed throughout this analysis.
Definitions
In this section we provide a few definitions that will be used in the following sections to draw the robustness analysis of the IBFT 2.0 protocol to conclusion. Most of these definitions were first introduced in [15] and are re-stated here for completeness.
t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant Persistence is defined as follows. As proved in Dwork et al. [5] , when the network communication is eventually synchronous, consensus is deterministically possible in a network of n nodes participating in the consensus protocol if and only if no more than f (n) ≡ n−1 3 of these nodes are Byzantine. The following definitions of optimal Byzantine-faulttolerant Safety, Persistence, Weak-Liveness and Liveness follow directly from this known lower limit. 
Safety Analysis of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
In this section we prove that the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol provides optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety.
We use the inductive assumption used by Lemma 3 in [15] , which states that the local blockchains of all honest nodes are identical until finalised block with height h − 1. Therefore, since the set of validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is a function of the local blockchain until the block with height h − 1, this set is identical amongst all honest validators. We denote the total number of validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol with n h . We also assume that for any instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, no more than f (n h ) validators are Byzantine. Proof. This is obvious from the pseudocode. Proof. Assume that the Lemma is false. This implies that two honest validators send two Commit messages including different block hashes. This, in turn, implies that each validator received at least Quorum(n h ) messages (one Proposal message and Quorum(n h ) − 1 Prepare messages) for each of the two different block hashes. Since two sets of size Quorum(n h ) validators always intersect in an honest validator, this implies that one honest validator sent a Proposal or Prepare message for one of the block hashes and a Proposal or Prepare message for the other block hash. This is a contradiction as Lemma 3 and Corollary 3.1 show that an honest validator never sends two different Prepare messages or two different Proposal messages and it sends either a Prepare message or a Proposal message for a given round, but never both.
Lemma 5. No two Prepared-Certificates for the same round and for different block hashes can be created.
Proof. By, contradiction assume that the Lemma is false and two Prepared-Certificates, say P C and P C ′ are created for the same round r but for different block hashes, say H and H ′ respectively. Since (i) a Prepared-Certificate includes at least Quorum(n h ) messages (between one Proposal message and Quorum(n h )−1 Prepare messages) and (ii) according to Lemma 1 any two sets of Quorum(n h ) validators are guaranteed to intersect in at least one honest validator, this implies that at least one honest validator sent a Proposal or Prepare message for round r and block hash H and a Proposal or Prepare message for round r and block hash H ′ . This is in contradiction with Lemma 3 and Corollary 3.1. Lemma 6. If an honest validator v creates a valid finalised block for the Ethereum block EB while in round r, then the proposed block included in any valid Proposal message sent after round r includes the same Ethereum block EB .
Proof. If an honest validator v creates a valid finalised block including the Ethereum block EB while in round r, then at least Quorum(n h ) − f (n h ) honest validators must have sent a valid Commit message for round r and the same block hash H = KEC ((EB , r) ). This, in turn, implies that all of these Quorum(n h ) − f (n h ) honest validators have set their respective latestP C variable to a Prepared-Certificate for block hash H at round r.
The proof is by induction on the round number. For the base case we show that the Lemma holds for any valid Proposal message sent for round r + 1. Since any valid Proposal message includes Quorum(n h ) Round-Change messages, Lemma 2 implies that at least one of these contains a Prepared-Certificate sent by an honest validator, say v ′ , that also sent a valid Commit message for block hash H at round r. Since v ′ sent a Commit message for block hash H at round r, v ′ must have included a valid Prepared-Certificate for round r and block hash H in its Round-Change message. Since valid Round-Change messages for round r + 1 can only contain Prepared-Certificates for round number up to r, and according to Lemma 5 no two valid Prepared-Certificates for the same round can be created, a valid Proposal message for round r + 1 must include a proposed block including an Ethereum block EB ′ such that KEC((r, EB ′ )) = H. This together with our assumption on the uniqueness property of the Keccak function imply that EB ′ = EB .
For the inductive step, we assume that the Lemma is valid for r ′ > r, and then show that the Lemma is also valid for r ′′ = r ′ + 1. Consider that based on our inductive assumption, for any round r ′′′ such that r < r ′′′ ≤ r ′ , if a valid Proposal message is sent then this message includes a proposed block including EB . This implies that if any honest validator created a Prepared-Certificate while in any round r ′′′ , then this Prepared-Certificate must be for hash KEC((r ′′′ , EB )) as honest validators only include valid Proposal message in their Prepared-Certificates. Now consider that since any valid Proposal message for rounds higher than 0 includes Quorum(n h ) Round-Change messages, Lemma 2 implies that at least one of these contains a Prepared-Certificate sent by an honest-validator, say v ′ , that also sent a valid Commit message for hash KEC((r, EB )) and round r. If this is the Prepared-Certificate with the highest round number that is included in the Round-Change-Certificate included in the Proposal message for round r ′′ then the Lemma is proved. If not, our consideration above and Lemma 5 imply that any valid Prepared-Certificate for any round r ′′′ , with r < r ′′′ ≤ r ′ , is for hash KEC((r ′′′ , EB )). This and our assumption on the uniqueness property of the Keccak hash function complete the proof. Lemma 7. If a valid finalised block including the Ethereum block EB is created in round r, then any other finalised block created at the same round or later round includes the same Ethereum block EB .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Hence, we assume that a finalised block including an Ethereum block EB ′ , with EB = EB ′ , is produced at round r ′ ≥ r. Lemma 1 implies that an honest validator, say v, sent both a Commit message for hash KEC((r, EB )) and round r and a Commit message for block hash KEC((r ′ , EB ′ )) and round r ′ . However, according to Lemma 6, only block EB can be proposed in a valid Proposal message for round r ′ . Hence, since honest validators only send Commit messages matching valid Proposal messages, this implies that v can only send Commit messages for block hash KEC((r ′′ , EB )) for any round r ′′ ≥ r which leads to a contradiction. Theorem 1. The IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol achieves optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerance threshold.
Proof. It is an obvious consequence of Lemma 7 that no two valid finalised blocks including two different Ethereum blocks can be produced by the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
Weak-Liveness Analysis of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol
In this section we show that the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol ensures optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Weak-Liveness. We analyse the generic h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol and, as in the Section above, we assume that, for any instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol, no more than f (n h ) validators are Byzantine. Lemma 8. Honest validators running the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol move to a round higher than the current one when one of the following events occurs:
• the round timer for the current round expires;
• they receive Quorum(n h ) Round-Change messages for a round higher than the current one sent by distinct validators; • they receive a valid Proposal message for a round higher than the current one.
Proof. Obvious from the pseudocode.
Lemma 9. If validator v starts round r at time t, then v will move to a round r ′ > r by the time t + RoundT imerT imeout(r).
Proof. Obvious from the following properties deductible from the pseudocode:
• on the expiry of the round timer for the current round, honest validators move to a higher round;
• the round timer for the current round is never restarted;
• validator v never moves to a round lower than the current round.
Let sr h,v (r) denote the time at which validator v starts round r of instance h.
Lemma 10.
Let v f be the first honest validator of instance h to start instance h. The following relation is verified for any honest validator v of instance h and round r such that both v f and v start round r at some point while in instance h:
Proof. The proof is by induction on the round number. The Lemma is obviously verified for the base case (r = 0) as we assume that v starts instance h before any other validator.
For the inductive case, we show by contradiction that if Lemma holds for r ′ then it also holds for r = r ′ + 1.
Assume that the Lemma holds for r ′ , but not for r. Since (i) v f started round r ′ no later than when v started round r ′ , (ii) the length of the round timer for round r ′ is identical between v f and v, (iii) validators move to a higher round either if the round timer for the current round expires, they receive Quorum(n h ) Round-Change messages, sent by distinct validators, for a round higher than the current one or if they receive a valid Proposal message with round number higher than the current one, the assumption that v moves to r before v f does implies that v received either Quorum(n h ) Round-Change messages, sent by distinct validators, for round r or a valid Proposal message for round r before v f moves to round r. This, in turn, implies that at least one honest validator different from v, say v ′ , sent a Round-Change message for round r, as at least one of the Round-Change messages received or included in the Proposal message has been sent by an honest validator. This implies that v ′ 's round timer for round r ′ expired before the v f 's round timer for round r ′ . This is in clear contradiction with conditions (i) and (ii) above.
Let nonF orcedRoundStart h,v (r) denote the time at which round r (and its related round timer) is started if v has moved to a higher round in each round < r only as effect of the round timer expiry.
Lemma 11. Let v f be the first honest validator of instance h to start instance h. The following condition is always verified:
Proof. The proof is by induction. The Lemma is obviously verified for the base case r = 0.
For the inductive case, we show by contradiction that if Lemma holds for r ′ then it also holds for r = r ′ + 1. Case 1: nonF orcedRoundStart h,v f (r) > sr h,v f (r). This and Lemma 8 imply that v f receives either Quorum(n h ) Round-Change messages, sent by distinct validators, for round r or a valid Proposal message for round r before the expiry of the round timer for round r ′ . For this to happen, as argued in the proof of Lemma 10, there must exist an honest validator different from v f , say v, that sends a Round-Change message for round r, and therefore starts round r before v f moves to round r. This is in contradiction with Lemma 10.
. This implies that round r is started after the expiry of round time for round r ′ . This is in contradiction with Lemma 9.
Lemma 12.
Let v ℓ be the last honest validator to start instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
The following relation is verified for any honest validator v of instance h and round r such that both v ℓ and v start round r at some point while in instance h:
Proof. The proof is by induction. The Lemma is obviously verified for the base case r = 0 as we assume that v ℓ is the last honest validator to start instance h, and therefore round 0.
Assume that there exists a validator v ′ for which nonF orcedRoundStart h,v ℓ (r) < sr h,v ′ (r). Since the Lemma is verified for r ′ , this implies that v ′ started round r after sr h,v ′ (r ′ )+timeoutForRoundZero(r ′ ) which contradicts Lemma 9.
Let si h,v be the time at which validator v starts the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol.
Lemma 13. The following equation holds for any validator v of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-blockfinalisation-protocol provided that validator v starts round r at some point while in instance h.
To be noted that nonF orcedRoundStart h,v (0) correctly corresponds to si h,v Lemma 14.
Let v f be the first honest validator of instance h to start round r, v ℓ be the last honest validator of instance h to start round r. minT imeAllHonestV alidatorsAreInT heSameRound(r), representing the length of the minimum time segment where all honest validators that started instance h are in round r at the same time, is expressed as follows:
Proof. It is obvious from Lemmas 10 to 12 that minT imeAllHonestV alidatorsAreInT heSameRound(r) ≡ max(nonF orcedRoundStart h,v f (r + 1) − nonF orcedRoundStart h,v ℓ (r), 0).
The following series of equivalences proves the Lemma:
To be noted that si h,v ℓ ≥ si h,v f . Lemma 15. The following inequality is verified for any n ≥ 0:
Proof. See Lemma 24 of [15] .
Lemma 16. Let ∆ be the maximum message delay after GST. Let r be a round such that:
• at least Quorum(n h ) honest validators start round r after GST;
• the proposer of round r is honest;
where v f is the first honest validator to start instance h and v ℓ is the last honest validator of a group of Quorum(n h ) honest validators to start instance h.
IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is guaranteed to produce a valid finalised block at round r.
Proof. si h,v f − si h,v ℓ + timeoutForRoundZero· 2 r ≥ 4 · ∆ implies that all of the Quorum(n h ) honest validators are in round r for at least 4 · ∆ time. Let v ℓ,r be the latest honest validator, of a group of Quorum(n h ) honest validators, to start round r. The following sequence of events that leads to the creation of a valid finalised block completes in no more than 4 · ∆ time.
synchronousRound(r f irstSynch ) is true. Since the propose function guarantees to select all honest validators of the current IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol instance for any sequence of n h,v rounds, there exists a round r ≥ r f irstSynch where the proposer is honest. Let r f irstHonestAf terSynch be the first round where the proposer is honest such that r f irstHonestAf terSynch ≥ r f irstSynch . Since 2 x is a strictly monotonically increasing function, if the condition synchronousRound(r f irstSynch ) is true, then the condition synchronousRound(r f irstHonestAf terSynch ) is true as well. Also, statements (iii), (iv) and (v) above imply that at least Quorum(n h ) honest validators start round r f irstHonestAf terSynch at some point while instance h except if a finalised block for height h is produced for a round lower than r f irstHonestAf terSynch . This proves that round r f irstHonestAf terSynch meets the conditions listed in Lemma 16.
Theorem 2. The IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees optimal Weak-Liveness.
Proof. Obvious from the definition of optimal Weak-Liveness and Lemmas 16 and 17.
Robustness Proof
Lemma 18. IBFT 2.0 achieves optimal Persistence.
Proof. The following considerations prove the Lemma:
• IBFT 2.0 implements the modification IBFT-M1 described in Section 5.1 of [15] ;
• Theorem 1 of [15] proves that modification IBFT-M1 and the guarantee that the IBFT-2.0-blockfinalisation-protocol provides optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Safety are sufficient conditions to ensure the the IBFT 2.0 protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant Persistence; • Theorem 1 of this paper proves that IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees optimal Byzantinefault-tolerant Safety.
The Persistence and Weak-Liveness properties have been proved by relying exclusively on the eventually synchronous network model assumption. To prove the Liveness property we introduce the following assumption which is a modified version of the Fair Scheduler assumption used by [1] . We show in Section 5.2.1 how the IBFT 2.0 protocol can be modified to remove the need for this assumption.
Assumption 1 (Fair Network Behaviour Assumption). The Fair Network Behaviour Assumption states that the probability that a message sent by a validator is received by another validator within time timeoutForRoundZero 3 is higher than 0.
Justification. The following considerations clarify why this assumption is indeed realistic:
• network latency is inherently probabilistic;
• it is expected that timeoutForRoundZero is set to a value at least 3 times higher that the known lower measured message latency. Proof. Direct consequence of the following invariants of the algorithm for modifying the validator set:
• only one vote for adding or removing validators can be cast per block;
• more than half of the validators must cast a consistent vote for the vote to have effect.
A more detailed proof may be provided in a future version of this work. Modification In order to remove the dependency of the robustness proof on the Fair Network Behaviour Assumption it is sufficient to require that the proposer selection function for height h only selects validators that did not propose any of the latest f (n h ) blocks where n h is the number of validators for the block with height h.
This modification corresponds to replacing the proposer(·, ·) function of the IBFT 2.0 protocol with the F airP roposer function defined below: return p
Justification This modification reduces the number of possible proposers for the next block from n h down to n h − f (n h ). Which implies that the minimum number of honest proposers for the next block is reduced from n h − f (n h ) down to n h − 2 · f (n h ). It is quite easy to prove that n h − 2 · f (n h ) > 0 which means that this modification guarantees that at least one of the possible proposers for the next block is honest. It is quite easy to see how this in turn implies that this modification does not affect the validity of the Weak-Liveness and Liveness properties proved in Section 4.
For any finalised block FB with height h, provided that there is no change to the validator list in the next f (n h ) + 1 blocks, since we assume that no more than f (n h ) validators are Byzantine, this modification ensures that at least one out of the next f (n h ) + 1 finalised blocks includes an Ethereum block created by an honest validator. It should be noted how this last statement can be used as sketch proof for Lemma 22 without depending on the Fair Network Behaviour Assumption any more. The modification described in this section, which is based on the very fast learning protocol presented by Dutta et al. [4] , allows reducing the minimum number of communication phases from three down to two:
Reduction of the block finalisation latency
1. The proposer for round 0 and instance h of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol sends a Proposal message to all validators; 2. All validators of height h, excluding the proposer for round 0, reply by sending a Prepare message to all validators; Once a validator for height h receives the Proposal message for round 0 from the proposer for round 0 and n h − 1 Prepare messages from all the non-proposing validators for round 0 it creates a finalised block.
Block finalisation in only two communication phases can be accomplished only if all the following conditions are met:
• all validators are honest;
• the network latency is less than timeoutForRoundZero 2 .
If we assume the same latency for the different communication phases, then when the conditions listed above are met, this modification reduces the block finalisation latency by 33%. To be noted that when the conditions listed above are not achieved, then the protocol degrades back to the performance of the original IBFT 2.0 protocol with no overhead.
This improvement requires applying the following modifications to the IBFT 2.0 protocol:
• If Improvement 5 is not applied, then a "Prepare seal" mast be added to the Prepare messages. If Improvement 5 is applied, then the Prepare messages do not need to be modified; • If a block is finalised in only two phases, then the commit seals include the signatures (or Prepare seals, if Improvement 5 is not applied) of the n h − 1 Prepare messages; • During the validation of a finalised block, if the number of commit seals is n h − 1 then the seals are interpreted as signature (Prepare seals, if Improvement 5 is not applied) of Prepare messages, otherwise if the number of seals is Quorum(n h ) then they are interpreted as signature (Commit seals, if Improvement 5 is not applied) of Commit messages; • When a validator sends a Round-Change message, if the validator has received a valid Proposal message for round 0, but it has never prepared , then it must include the Proposal message in the Round-Change message. After the first time that a validator prepares while running instance h of the IBFT-2.0-blockfinalisation-protocol, the validator will only include the latest Prepared-Certificate in any Round-Change message that it sends; • When a validator sends a Proposal message for a round number higher than 0, if there exists an Ethereum block EB such that: -EB is the only one Ethereum block such that at least f (n h )+1 of the Round-Change messages forming the Round-Change-Certificate (included in the Proposal message) include a Proposal message for round 0 and for this block; -no Round-Change message include a valid Prepared-Certificate then the proposed block included in the Proposal message must include the Ethereum block EB . If the conditions listed above are not met, then the Ethereum block to be included in a Proposal message with height higher than 0 must be determined as specified by the original IBFT 2.0 protocol; • On the reception of a Proposal message for a round higher than 0, the same calculation must be performed to validate the Proposal message.
As per the description above, this modification allows reducing the minimum number of communication phases from three down to two only for round 0. While it is possible to modify the IBFT 2.0 protocol to reduce the minimum number of communication phases down to two for any round, because of the following reasons, we believe that this optimisation should be applied only to round 0:
• applying the optimisation for rounds higher than 0 as well requires potentially increasing the size of the Round-Change message by the size of one block as the latest accepted Proposal message and the latest Prepared-Certificate can refer to two different blocks; • if the conditions required to achieve block finalisation in two phases are not met for round 0, then either (i) one or more validators are Byzantine and can therefore prevent block finalisation in two phases at any round or (ii) the network latency is higher than timeoutForRoundZero 2 which means that block finalisation latency is already higher than timeoutForRoundZero and therefore whether block finalisation is reached in two or three phases at the next round adds only minimal improvement to the block finalisation latency. rounds higher than 0 becomes independent of the block size.
Similarly, if this improvement is applied then the size of Proposal messages for rounds higher than 0 becomes independent of the Round-Change message size. Therefore, there is no more need to split the Round-Change message between a signed portion and an unsigned portion and all message fields can be moved within the signed portion of the message.
Justification The justification for this modification is based on how the Gossip protocol works. Specifically, when a validator receives a message from one of its peers, it transmits that message to all other peers. This is essentially similar to how the transmission of a message works: a message is sent to all peers. The only difference between the reception and the transmission is that when a message is received the message is not transmitted to the peer that sent it as that peer already has the message. Hence, in the IBFT 2.0 protocol, when a validator sends a Proposal message for a round higher than 0, the Round-Change messages included in the Round-Change-Certificate have already been transmitted to the same peers that the Proposal message will be transmitted to. Since a validator sends a Proposal message as soon as it receives Quorum(n h ) Round-Change messages, the Round-Change messages included in the Proposal message are transmitted to the peers not long before the Proposal message is transmitted as well. To be noted that the Round-Change-Certificate cannot be removed from the Proposal message as validators receiving a Proposal message must be able to determine whether any valid block or only a prepared block could have been included as proposed block in the Proposal message. If the Round-Change-Certificate is completely removed then the only way for validators to validate Proposal messages is to receive a Round-Change message from each of the n h validators which could impair the liveness of the protocol as f (n h ) of the validators may be Byzantine and never send a Round-Change message.
Improvement 5:
Remove the commit seal from the Commit message and replace the commit seals included in a block with the signatures of the Commit messages received Modification This improvement requires the following modifications to the IBFT 2.0 protocol:
• remove the commit seal from the Commit message;
• when composing a finalisation proof, collate the signatures of Quorum(n h ) valid Commit messages sent by distinct validators; • when validating a finalised block, reconstruct the body of the Commit message that would have been sent for the block under validation and verify that each of the signatures included in the finalisation proof is a valid signature of the reconstructed Commit message by one of the validators. This can be done via the Elliptic Curve Signature Recovery function.
Justification Finalised blocks include all of the information required to reconstruct the body of the Commit message sent for that specific block, namely: the block height, the round number at which the Quorum(n h ) Commit messages where received and the hash of the block. Justification The purpose of the h-th instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is to decide on the Ethereum block to be added at height h. Therefore, using the PBFT [3] terminology, the value to be decided by each instance of the IBFT-2.0-block-finalisation-protocol is the Ethereum block, not the tuple composed by the Ethereum block and the current round number. The round number is added to the finalisation proof exclusively because the finalisation proof composed of Quorum(n h ) commit seals is valid only if these commit seals were included in Commit messages targeting the same round number.
